The Federal District Court properly enjoined a Mississippi state court's proposed congressional redistricting plan and fashioned its own plan under 2 U. S. C. §2c.

A debt for money promised in a settlement agreement accompanied by the release of underlying tort claims can amount to a debt for money obtained by fraud, within the terms of 11 U. S. C. §523(a)(2)(A), the Bankruptcy Code's nondischargeability provision.

Interest earned on client funds deposited in IOLTA accounts that is transferred to a different owner for a legitimate public use may constitute a per se taking requiring "just compensation" to the client under the Fifth Amendment; but because such compensation is measured by the owner's pecuniary interest, which is zero whenever Washington's IOLTA law is obeyed, there is no violation of the Just Compensation Clause here.

Respondents have presented no genuine issues of material fact with regard to whether Cuyahoga Falls violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses by submitting to voters a facially neutral referendum petition calling for the repeal of a municipal ordinance authorizing construction of a low-income housing complex.

For purposes of applying the rule in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, a case does not become "pending" until an actual application for habeas relief is filed in federal court; respondent's application is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 because it was not filed until after AEDPA's effective date.

Local governments are "persons" amenable to qui tam actions under the federal False Claims Act.

Mental anguish damages resulting from the fear of developing cancer may be recovered under the Federal Employers' Liability Act by a railroad worker suffering from the actionable injury asbestosis caused by work-related exposure to asbestos; the FELA's express terms, reinforced by consistent judicial applications of the Act, allow such a worker to recover his entire damages from a railroad whose negligence jointly caused his injury, thus placing on the railroad the burden of seeking contribution from other potential tortfeasors.

The Second Circuit's judgment enjoining the public disclosure provisions of Connecticut's "Megan's Law" must be reversed because due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact, here, current dangerousness, that is not material to the State's statutory scheme.

The Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that the California Court of Appeal's decision affirming Andrade's sentence for a "third strike" conviction is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, this Court's clearly established law within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).

The California Court of Appeal's decision that Ewing's sentence under the State's three strikes law is not grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments is affirmed.