Because Alaska's "Megan's Law" is nonpunitive, its retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Under United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535, and United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, the Navajo Tribe's claim for compensation from the Government based on the Interior Secretary's actions with respect to a coal lease between the Tribe and a private lessee fails, for it does not derive from any liability-imposing provision of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 or its implementing regulations.

For the purpose of starting the clock on the 1-year limitation period for federal prisoners to file habeas corpus petitions pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2255, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a certiorari petition contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the conviction.

The Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires proof of actual dilution; the evidence in this case is insufficient to support summary judgment for respondents on the dilution count.

Title 26 CFR §1.861-8(e)(3) (1979)-which governs allocation of research and development expenses in computing taxable income from export sales entitled to special tax treatment under Internal Revenue Code provisions pertaining to "domestic international sales corporations" and "foreign sales corporations"-is a proper exercise of the Secretary of the Treasury's rulemaking authority.

Public Law 86-392 gives rise to Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over respondent Tribe's suit for money damages against the United States for breach of a fiduciary duty to manage Fort Apache land and improvements held in trust for the Tribe but occupied by the Government.