In 1995, the Michigan Department of Corrections revised its prison visitation policy to: (1) prohibit visits by a minor child, unless the minor is the child, stepchild or grandchild of the prisoner; (2) prohibit visits by a prisoner's child when the prisoner's parental rights have been terminated; (3) require that all visiting minor children be accompanied by a parent or legal guardian; (4) prohibit visits by former inmates unless the former inmate is in the prisoner's immediate family; and (5) impose a ban on visitation for a minimum of two years for any inmate found guilty of two or more major misconduct's for substance abuse. Do these restrictions, as set forth above, (a) violate a right of intimate association under the First Amendment as retained by a incarcerated felon or (b) constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment?

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. 441b, prohibits corporations and labor unions from making direct campaign contributions and independent expenditures in connection with federal elections. The question presented is whether Section 441b's prohibition on contributions violates the First Amendment to the Constitution if it is applied to a nonprofit corporation whose primary purpose is to engage in political advocacy.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting petitioner's argument that allowing the government to administer antipsychotic medication against his will solely to render him competent to stand trial for non-violent offenses would violate his rights under the First Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.

Can the State of Iowa tax the revenue from slot machines at parimutuel racetracks and the revenue from all casino games on riverboats, including slot machines, at different rates without violating the Equal Protection Clause?

Consolidated with 02-5034

1. Whether section 144 of the 1996 Farm Bill creates an unmistakably clear blanket exemption to the dormant Commerce Clause For California's interstate regulation of the dairy industry, which would be otherwise limited by this Court's holding in baldwin v. G.A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935), and its progeny? 2. Whether it is proper for courts to resort to legislative history or a paraphrase of a statute in order to discern an unmistakably clear Congressional exemption to the negative Commerce Clause?

1. Did the Ninth Circuit err in holding that direct evidence is not required in Title VII cases to trigger the application of the mixed-motive analysis set out in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins? 2. What are the appropriate standards for lower courts to follow in making a direct evidence determination in mixed-motive cases under Title VII?

This Court has long held that section 30 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86, creates an exclusive federal cause of action and an exclusive federal remedy for usury claims by borrowers against national banks, preempting state law under the doctrine of ordinary preemption. Borrowers filed this case against a national bank in state court, claiming violation of state usury law, and the national bank removed the case to federal district court, where a motion to remand was denied. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ordered the district court to remand the case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and explicitly disagreed with decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit holding that section 30 completely preempts state usury claims against national banks and thus permits removal of cases asserting state usury laws against them. The question presented is:

1. Does the Lanham Act protect creative works form uncredited copying, even without a likelihood of consumer confusion? 2. May a court applying the Lanham Act award twice the defendant's profits for purely deterrent purposes?

Whether Mississippi Power & light v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988), and Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986), require a state public utility commission to allow an electric utility member of a multi-state power system to recover, in retail rates, the costs allocated to it by a rate schedule of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), or whether the state commission has jurisdiction to decide that it was imprudent for such a utility to incur the costs allocated to it under a FERC rate schedule, thereby trapping such wholesale costs?