I. Did the Court of Appeals err when they concluded that Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Massih v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), was not violated because Petitioner was not interrogated by Government agents; when the proper standard under Supreme Court precedent, is whether the Government agents deliberately elicited information from Petitioner? 2. Should the second statements- preceded by Miranda warnings- have been suppressed as fruits of the illegal posts indictment interview without the presence of counsel, under this Court;s decisions in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)?

Does 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(l) authorize a court to award fees to a debtor's attorney?

Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in upholding the EPA's assertion of authority to second-guess a permitting decision made by the State of Alaska--which had been delegated permitting authority under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.--in conflict with decisions of this Court and other federal courts of appeals establishing the division of federal-state jurisdiction under the Act and similar statutory programs.

This case involves the Early and Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) component of the Medicaid Act. U.S.C. 1396a(a)(43);139d®. Another case pending before this Court also involves EPSDT. Haveman v. Westside Mothers, No.02-277. If the Court grants a writ of certiorari in that case to address questions related to this case, the Petitioner-children ask the Court to suspend this case pending resolution of the other. I. Do State officials waive Eleventh Amendment immunity by urging the district court to adopt a consent decree when the decree is based on federal law and specifically provides for the district court's ongoing supervision of the official's decree compliance? 2. Does the Eleventh Amendment bar a district court from enforcing a consent decree entered into by state officials unless the plaintiffs show that the decree violation is also a violation of a federal right remediable under 1983? 3. Does State officials' failure to provide services required by the Medicaid Act's EPSDT provisions violate right that Medicaid recipients may enforce pursuant to 42 U.S C.§ 1983? See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43); 1396d®.

Whether the Court of appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that an investment scheme is excluded from the term investment contract in the definitions of ''securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10), if the promoter promises a fixed rather than variable return or if the investor is contractually entitled to a particular amount or rate of return.

1. Whether allegations of inadequacies in a monopolist's affirmative assistance to its rivals, including resellers—as newly provided by incumbent local telephone companies under the Telecommunications Act of 1996—state a claim for unlawful unilateral predatory conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act 2. Whether antitrust and Communications Act standing extends to indirect purchasers, I.e., the customers of the defendant's customer, asserting injuries wholly derivative of the direct customer's injury, even when invoking only the direct customer's legal rights.

Whether Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), prohibits police officers from conducting a checkpoint organized to investigate a prior offense, at which checkpoint law enforcement officers briefly stopped all oncoming motorists to hand out flyers about—and look for witnesses to—the offense, where the checkpoint was conducted exactly one week after—and at approximately the same time of day as—the offense, and where the checkpoint otherwise met the reasonableness standard articulated in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).