The Washington Constitution provides that no public money shall be appropriated or applied to religious instruction. Following this constitutional command, Washington does not grant college scholarships to otherwise eligible students who are pursuing a degree in theology. Does the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment require the state to fund religious instruction, if it provides college scholarships for secular instruction?

The federal antitrust laws apply to a person, which is defined to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of * * * the United States. 15 U.S.C.7 (sherman Act), 12 (a) (Clayton Act). The question presented is whether the United States Postal Service is a person amenable to suit under the antitrust laws.

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit properly ruled that a law enforcement officer violated clearly established law, and thus was personally liable in damages and not entitled to qualified immunity, when at the time he acted there was no decision by the Supreme Court or any other court so holding, and the only lower court decisions addressing the issue had found the same conduct did not violate the law?

Whether the Court of appeals erred in holding, contrary to decisions of the First and Seventh Circuits, that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 621-634, prohibits reverse discrimination, I.e., employer action practices, or policies that treat older workers more favorably than younger workers who are at least 40 years old.

Whether the accident condition precedent to air carrier liability for a passenger's death under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention is satisfied when a passenger's pre-existing medical condition is aggravated by exposure to a normal condition in the aircraft cabin, even if the carrier's negligence were a link in the chain, of causation? The Ninth Circuit's answer to this question in the affirmative directly conflicts with the Third and Eleventh Circuit decisions in Abramson v. Japan Airlines, Co., Ltd., 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. Denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985) and Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1111 (1998), and is contrary to the Court's decision in Air France. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).

In this Texas capital case, the Fifth Circuit (in an unpublished order) overturned the district court's issuance of habeas corpus relief as to Petitioner Delma Banks' sentence. Banks contends that the Court of Appeals reached this result only by misapplying and misinterpreting well-established 'precedents of this Court regarding, inter alia, prosecutorial misuse of peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from Banks' petit jury, and trial counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Banks seeks review by this Court of the following questions: 1. Did the Fifth Circuit commit legal error in rejecting Banks' Brady claim— that the prosecution suppressed material witness impeachment evidence that prejudiced him in the penalty phase of his trial--on the grounds that: (a) the evidence supporting the claim was procedurally defaulted, notwithstanding the fact that, like in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), there was no reasonable basis for concluding that counsel for Banks could have discovered the suppressed evidence prior to or during that trial or state post-conviction proceedings; and (b) the suppressed evidence was immaterial to Banks' death sentence, where the panel neglected to consider that the trial prosecutors viewed the evidence to be of utmost importance to showing a capital sentence was appropriate? 2.Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Stricland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),where it weighed each item of mitigating evidence separately and concluded that no single category would have brought a different result at sentencing without weighing the impact of the evidence collectively? 3. Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Harris v. Nelsen, 394 U.S. 286 (1969)and Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) in holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceeding because evidentiary hearings in those proceedings are not similar to civil trials? 4. Did the Fifth Circuit err in refusing to consider Bank's jury discrimination claim--virtually identical to one this Court is consider Bank's jury discrimination claim-- virtually identical to one this Court is considering in Miller-El v. Cockrell (No.01-7662)--based upon its conclusions that: (a) the state court's rejection of that claim rested upon an adequate and independent state ground; and that (b) there was inadequate prejudice to Mr. Bank's interest to excuse his counsel's failing to present, at trail, direct and statistical evidence of the prosecution's consistent policy of using peremptory challenges to keep African Americans off felony juries?